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Abstract 
The press should ideally be the eyes, ears and voice of the public in any state. However, 
freedom of the press varies across states and is especially lacking in autocratic ones. 
This paper asks how the press in autocracies tackles the challenge of reporting on 
contentious mobilization, i.e. protests events that threaten the very survival of the 
regime. For this, it relies on count and structural topic models applied to an original 
dataset of roughly half a million newspaper articles published before and after the 
events of the Arab Spring (January 2009 – December 2011), and on new protest event 
data from the Mass Mobilizations in Autocracies Dataset. We find that both the extent 
of coverage and its content is influenced by the overall degree of censorship in MENA 
countries. Moreover, threats to authoritarian regimes, measured both as intensity of 
domestic protests and intensity of protests across the wider MENA region, also 
influence the coverage of the issue. We also find that these effects are stronger for state 
owned newspapers. 
  
Keywords 
Arab Spring, Censorship, Contentious mobilization, MENA, Topic models  
		 2	
Introduction 
Information on political protests can significantly lower the revolutionary 
thresholds through bandwagon processes and informational cascades (e.g. Granovetter, 
1978; Kuran, 1991; Lohmann, 1993). More precisely, information on protests gives 
cues to the broader population about the strength or weakness of the regime and can 
make individuals more likely to join protests. This, in turn, increases the incentives for 
autocratic regimes to suppress any reports on political protests. In a world of the 
Internet and mobile phones, however, an autocratic regime can hardly suppress all 
information on contentious mobilization, which is why it increasingly needs to manage 
information on protests. This means to influence the bias of reports on these events 
according to its own interests. This paper seeks to explore the variance in reporting 
practices of the media in autocratic regimes of the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) and answer the question how they tackle the challenge of reporting on 
events that threaten the very survival of the regime.  
For this, it relies on machine learning to extract texts on contentious politics 
from an original dataset of roughly half a million newspaper paragraphs published by 
English-language newspapers in MENA countries before and after the onset of the Arab 
Spring (January 2009 – December 2011). Subsequently, count and structural topic 
models (Roberts et al. 2014) are applied to this original corpus in order to explore the 
expected reporting bias. Independent variables measuring the threat to the survival of 
the regime are derived from the Mass Mobilizations in Autocracies Dataset (Weidmann 
and Rød 2014). Variables measuring specific censorship events are derived from a 
novel dataset created especially for this study.  
In this paper we establish that the MENA press does report on the issue of 
contentious mobilizations irrespective of ownership or overall press freedom, though 
both aspects influence the quantitative output on the subject. We also establish that the 
state-owned press reacts strategically to threats to the authoritarian regime it belongs to: 
when protests in the MENA region increase, the state owned press reduces coverage of 
the issue, but when domestic protests intensify it increases coverage of the issue. 
Furthermore, censoring specific news reduces the coverage of only the state owned 
newspapers. 
Looking at the content aspects of reporting, we identify fourteen distinct topics 
employed by the MENA press when reporting on the issue of contentious mobilizations, 
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some of these topics being specific to the Arab Spring events. The prevalence of most of 
these topics varies significantly as protests (foreign or domestic) intensify and also 
depends on the degree of press freedom the media enjoys. The prevalence of these 
topics also varies significantly as censorship of specific news intensifies, but for some 
topics the effect is contrary to what was intended. A prime example for the bias present 
in the MENA press coverage of contentious politics is the ‘revolution’ topic, the 
prevalence of which drops the stronger a state’s control over the press is and increases 
the more intense protests (domestic or foreign) become. However, the prevalence of this 
topic rises significantly as a state intensifies its efforts to suppress specific domestic 
news (such as news about domestic protests), despite controlling for both the intensity 
of protests abroad and at home. 
 
Media and contentious mobilization in authoritarian regimes 
Overthrowing an authoritarian regime is tremendously difficult, since it requires 
ordinary citizens to overcome paramount collective action problems. Among these 
problems figure the prevalence of preference falsification (Kuran, 1991), the presence 
of state repression and the absence of independent sources of information on the 
strength of both the regime as well as anti-regime sentiments among the population 
(Besley and Prat, 2006). In an authoritarian regime, the government therefore often 
colludes with the mass media to ensure that contentious mobilization is not reported. In 
other words, the fundamental function of the media to disseminate information can 
develop into a perilous risk for a regime when it comes to the coverage of political 
protests. Ultimately, information on anti-government protests give signals about the 
weakening of the regime. If the government is not able to censor reports on protests to a 
high degree, people update their beliefs about the weakness of the regime and, in turn, 
are more likely to join protests (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2015).  
Formal models and empirical assessments of contentious mobilization suggest 
that ‘informational cascades’ play a crucial role in overcoming collective action 
problems (e.g. Lohmann, 1993). This literature highlights how information about the 
aggregate intensity of contentious mobilization conveys informational cues about the 
citizen’s political preferences, and how these cues trigger changes in the beliefs about 
the value of participating in anti-regime protests. The larger an existing opposition 
movement, the larger are the incentives for participation, since the likelihood of 
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repression for siding with the opposition is decreasing. More specifically, there is a 
‘revolutionary threshold’, which denotes the point at which the costs of supporting an 
actually despised regime outweigh the costs of joining the opposition movement. 
Moreover, a revolutionary cascade or ‘bandwagon’ ensures that others join the 
opposition as well, and “authoritarian regimes that once appeared unshakeable can see 
their support crumble in no time” (Crabtree et al., 2015). This is why it is so important 
for regimes to maintain control over the production and dissemination of information. 
Citizens generally lack the opportunity to monitor contentious mobilization 
directly, so they have to rely on information from the media to update them on political 
activities (Bairett, 2015). Hence, protests in autocracies occur only when those opposed 
to the regime perceive that dissatisfaction is wide-spread and government repression 
ineffective (Kim, Whitten-Woodring and James, 2015). In a world of the Internet and 
mobile phones, many regimes can hardly suppress all information on collective action, 
which would be the optimal solution for any authoritarian regime (but see King et al. 
2013 on China).  During the Arab Spring, most MENA countries lacked free media. 
Hence, professional journalists, bloggers, and ordinary citizens who criticized the 
authorities were censored, fined, imprisoned, harassed, physically threatened or hurt, or 
worse (Kim et al. 2014). Nevertheless, many journalists and citizens persisted in 
spreading information about contentious mobilization, especially via social media 
(Gohdes, 2015). Nowadays, such regimes are thus rather forced to manage information 
on protests. So it seems plausible that a regime would want to induce a bias in the 
reporting on political protests to tend to their own interests (Entman, 2004:5). Empirical 
evidence also substantiates this claim, as demonstrated by Baum and Zhukov (2015) 
who find that the media in non-democracies underreport peaceful protests by regime 
opponents, overreport violent ones and largely ignore government atrocities. Thus, if 
authoritarian regimes were willing to let the people be informed about political protests 
at all, there are several strategies that can lower the risk of revolutionary cascades. The 
most straightforward option for the regime is the portrayal of protests as illegitimate 
(e.g. 'terrorism', 'crime'), insignificant (e.g. 'isolated event') or easy to suppress. The 
framing of protests in such a way, especially by the state-owned media, has been 
documented for example in the case of the Egyptian press (Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012). 
A more subtle strategy is to let media report about protests without interference for as 
long as they don’t portray them as revolutionary or in a positive light. The practice of 
such self-censorship during the Arab Spring has been documented even for MENA 
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countries enjoying a relatively free press (Alkazemi and Wanta, 2015). In general, it can 
be assumed that the induced bias in the reporting on contentious politics is of a nature, 
which lowers the likelihood of individuals to join in mass mobilizations against the 
regime (Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014).  
Given the considerations above, we first pursue the question of whether the 
media in MENA countries is indeed biased with regards to coverage intensity. More 
precisely, we ask ourselves whether the amount of coverage contentious mobilizations 
receives in the media is dependent on press freedom or threats to the survival of the 
authoritarian regime. Second, we pursue the same question with regards to the contents 
of the reports. 
 
Methodology 
Data sources and preprocessing  
The time frame we examine begins in January 2009, which is roughly two years 
before the first protests of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and encompasses the Iranian 
Green Movement as a counterpoint to Arab Spring protests. The time frame ends in 
December 2011. To analyze how the MENA media covers contentious politics, and to 
gain a handle on the censorship policies of MENA states, we rely on three new datasets, 
as well as the Freedom House dataset. 
The first dataset is comprised of articles published in the newspapers listed in 
Table A.1. Currently we have processed articles from thirty-three English-language 
newspapers from eleven MENA countries. We retrieved most newspaper articles from 
the databases LexisNexis and Factiva using simple but broad keyword searches1. Web-
scraping the homepages of newspapers not available in the aforementioned databases 
yielded additional articles for our analysis. We then split the articles into paragraphs of 
similar length (ca. 150 words), which yielded a corpus of 523’434 paragraphs. A 
manual evaluation of a random sample of 1’334 documents revealed that 31.2% of the 
texts covered contentious politics. Such relevant texts are those that provide coverage of 
public, politically motivated and unconventional actions (Dolezal et al. 2012). This 
definition thus excludes for example institutional processes (e.g. elections or court 																																																								
1  The keyword string for the different newspaper database was an adaptation of “protest! OR demonstrat! OR 
manifest! OR marche! OR marchi! OR tumult! OR parade OR rall! OR picket! OR (human chain) OR riot! OR affray 
OR unrest! OR clash! OR vigil OR strike! OR boycott! OR block! OR sit-in OR squat! OR mutin! OR revolt! OR 
revolution! OR oust! OR rebel! OR dissent! OR turmoil! OR violen!” depending on the options available for Boolean 
operators and truncation wildcards.  
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cases) and most protests by elites (e.g. diplomatic protests). At the same time the 
definition includes actions such as strikes, collection of signatures, petitions, 
demonstrations, marches, protest camps/meetings/vigils/rallies, boycotts, cyber-attacks, 
hunger strikes, refusals of payment, blockades, squattings, symbolic violence against 
objects or persons, bomb and arson attacks, sabotage, riots, destruction of private or 
public buildings, violence against persons and clashes with the police. Since we are 
interested in how newspapers cover political protest events, we do not evaluate whether 
the events described actually took place or not. Consequently, we also include threats to 
mobilize and planned events.  
In a pre-processing step, we converted all words of the 523’434 documents to 
lowercase, applied Porter’s stemming algorithm and removed punctuation, stop-words 
and sparse words. Furthermore, we substituted abbreviations and n-words relating to 
countries, organizations and political parties with corresponding single tokens (e.g. 
“UAE” to “UnitedArabEmirates). Using the manually coded paragraphs as the training 
set, we classified all paragraphs of our corpus as either relevant or irrelevant by using an 
ensemble consisting of five support vector machine (SVM) classifiers. An ensemble is a 
tool that aggregates the results produced by multiple classifiers, which may use different 
classification algorithms (Dietterich, 2000; Collingwood and Wilkerson, 2012). The text 
classification was implemented using the R package classyfire, which has several 
advantages compared to prior approaches, ranging from increased computational speed, 
to automated bootstrapped training, automated parameter optimization and permutation 
testing (Chatzimichali and Bessant, 2016). The SVM ensemble achieved an F-Score of 
0.84 (0.85 precision and 0.83 recall) when tested against the manually coded validation 
set. Using this ensemble we obtained a corpus of 104’183 documents dealing with 
contentious politics. We also collected ownership information for the newspapers 
included in our corpus. We relied primarily on WAN-IFRA country reports (World 
Association of Newspapers, 2010), but crosschecked and complemented the data with 
information provided by the homepages of the respective newspapers and other sources. 
We differentiate between outright state-owned newspapers and other (semi-) 
independent ones.  
The second dataset, the protest event dataset, stems from the collaboration in the 
“Mass Mobilization in Autocracies Dataset” project (Weidmann and Rød, 2014).  A 
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first release of the dataset is expected later this year2. This dataset includes the date, 
location and side (pro- or anti-government) of all protest events for the MENA region 
for the time period of interest, as reported by Agence France Presse, The Associated 
Press and BBC Monitoring. The independent variables domestic protests and MENA 
protests operationalize the concept of threat to the survival of the authoritarian regime. 
They count the number of events taking place each week in a given country and 
respectively across the entire MENA region. 
The third dataset comprises censorship events against press, radio and TV. The 
raw data stems primarily from Reporters without Borders news releases and is 
complemented by U.S. Department of State and Freedom House country reports, as well 
as several Human Rights organizations mentioned in these news and reports. Censorship 
events include arrests, attacks, blocking of information dissemination, confiscating or 
destroying equipment, fines, gag orders, kidnappings, killings, laws, lawsuits, 
unemployment, temporary or permanent shut-downs, threats and sexual harassment. 
The aim of such actions ranges from the national over the organizational and down to 
the individual level. Coding events at the national and organizational level is 
straightforward, but events at the individual level are often less clear. We decided to 
code an event at this level whenever a journalist is hindered from collecting or 
publishing some news data. We also differentiate between violent and not violent 
events, violent events being any actions that include physical violence against 
journalists and even the rather marginal cases where journalists were arrested or 
otherwise detained against their will. Finally, we also differentiate between acts of 
retaliation against journalists or organizations, provoked by some news reporting in the 
past, and acts of suppression, which do not target specific journalists or organization, 
but aim to hinder the (timely) reporting on some current event.  
Due to the very limited number of censorship events at the national level, we 
exclude this particular variable from our analysis. All other variables have been recoded 
as count data, where we count the number of relevant events which took place during 
the month prior to the week of publication of an article in the respective country. In 
addition to the aforementioned censorship variables, we also constructed a general 
censorships variable counting all events in a similar manner. We also take into 
consideration the overall level of censorship in a country during a given year by 																																																								2	Article manuscript, codebook and eventually the dataset are available at http://www.cnc.uni-
konstanz.de/research/mmad/	
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including the three Freedom House indices measures economic, political and legal 
environments in our analysis. 
 
Estimations 
The question on what influences the amount of ink the MENA press dedicates to 
contentious politics is explored by negative binomial regressions. We estimate a total of 
8 models, where the dependent variable is the number of paragraphs on contentious 
politics published during a week by a given newspaper (see Table A.2). The dependent 
variable is characterized by a high number of weeks with no such paragraphs. A high 
count of 0 in the dependent variable usually leads to an over-dispersed estimation if the 
usual Poisson model were to be used (Long and Freese, 2006). As the highly significant 
log-likelihood ratio test for Model 1.0 in Table A.2 indicates, a negative binominal 
regression is therefore recommended in this particular case. 
The basic model (Model 1.0) includes the independent variables economic, 
political and legal control, ownership, domestic protests, MENA protests and the 
censorships variable. Models 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0 expand on the basic model by substituting 
the censorships variable with the variables detailing the different kinds of censorship 
events, namely suppression and retaliation in Model 2.0, violence and non-violence in 
Model 3.0 and individual and organization in Model 4.0. These models are in turn 
expanded in Models 1.1, 2.1, 3.1 and 4.1 through the inclusion of interactions between 
ownership on the one hand, and the censorship and protest variables on the other. Like 
the number of paragraphs, all variables counting protests and censorship events are 
highly skewed towards 0, which is why we log-transformed these variables in our 
models using the formula log(x+1). All models include as controls country fixed effects 
and a weekly time trend to minimize serial correlation.  
The question of how the MENA press writes about contentious politics and what 
influences this decision, we explore with a structural topic model (STM) (Roberts et al., 
2014), which allows us to estimate document probabilities for latent variables, called 
topics. STM builds on the Latent Dirichlet Allocation, a hierarchical mixed-membership 
model in which the document-topic and word-topic probabilities have a common prior 
drawn from a Dirichlet distribution (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003). One of the STM's 
major innovations is that the prior distribution of topics (i.e. topic prevalence) can be 
influenced by covariates. The STM analysis includes the same covariates as the 
		 9	
negative binominal regression. 
A crucial decision in every application of a topic model pertains to the 
granularity, i.e. the number of topics, which needs to be determined a-priori. A topic 
model with too few topics will produce overly broad, diffuse topics, while a model with 
too many topics will results in many small, hardly distinguishable topics (Greene and 
Cross, 2015). An increasingly popular strategy to resolve this problem is to compare the 
coherence of different topic models. To this purpose, we use word2vec (Mikolov et al., 
2013), which learns and aggregates term similarities through a shallow neural network 
process. Word2vec suggests a granularity of 14 for our corpus and a candidate range of 
13 to 16 topics (see Figure A.1), these numbers resulting from comparing the coherence 
within and between the vectors of most probable words for each topic model.  
 
Results   
Media attention to contentious mobilization 
A first overview of media coverage on contentious politics clearly shows the 
importance of the Arab Spring (see Figure 1). Already before the first turning point, 
namely the ousting of Tunisian ruler Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the number of weekly 
reports on contentious mobilization starts to climb and reaches its peak with the onset of 
the NATO intervention in Libya. The regimes in the MENA region were thus largely 
incapable (or unwilling) to suppress most of the information on political protests even in 
traditional media, which are relatively easy to censor, especially in the frequent case of 
state ownership. This result sharply contrasts the sophisticated and highly effective 
efforts to suppress information on collective action on all channels including the 
Internet in countries such as Iran or China (King et al. 2013). 
The results of the negative binomial regressions (see Table A.2.) show that according to 
the Aikake information criterion regressions modeling interactions between variables 
are marginally better than their respective counterparts. However, irrespective of which 
model we look at, the two Freedom House indicators measuring the state’s economic 
and legal control over the media are highly significant, while the third indicator, 
political control, is also significant in all but the last model. 
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Figure 1: Coverage of contentious politics in MENA media over time 
 
As shown in Figure 2, which plots the effects of these variables according to 
Model 1.1, these variables influence our dependent variable in quite different ways. 
Economic control has by far the greatest influence and its negative sign conforms to our 
expectation that tighter economic control over the media diminishes the number of 
paragraphs published concerning contentious politics. Contrary to our initial 
expectations, tighter political and legal control does not lead to less publishing, but 
actually increases the number of paragraphs on contentious politics.  
 The domestic protest variable is similarly highly significant across the board, 
having a positive effect on the dependent variable. The main effect of this variable 
remains fairly constant even when we consider its interaction with the newspaper 
ownership variable. Furthermore, as Models 1.1 and 4.1 indicate, state owned 
newspapers react significantly different than other newspapers, namely printing less 
paragraphs on contentious politics, when domestic protests are absent or only few in 
number (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: Relationship between overall political, economic and legal control over the media and the 
newspapers’ coverage of  contentious politics. 
 
The MENA protests variable has a negative effect on the dependent variable in 
each model and the effect is significant in each model lacking interactions. In models 
that do consider interaction effects, the main effect of the variable falls below the 
statistical threshold of significance, but the interaction with the ownership variable 
shows that state owned newspapers write significantly less about contentious politics as 
protests in the MENA region intensify (see Figure 3). 
Turning to the censorship variables we find more complex relationships. 
Looking at the results of Models 1.0 we find that the general censorships variable has a 
slight negative effect on the dependent variable, but this effect doesn’t reach the 
statistical significance level. However, when we interact this variable with the 
ownership variable both the main effect and the interaction effect become significant. 
As evidenced in Figure 3, there is little difference between state owned and other 
newspapers when there are no censorship events of any kind, but as such events 
increase in number state owned newspapers react by publishing less paragraphs on 
contentious politics, while other newspaper publish more. Differentiating between 
censorship events motivated by retaliation and suppression, as in Models 2.0 and 2.1, 
leads to mixed results. In Model 2.0 only the retaliation variable has a slight, but 
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significant effect, while in Model 2.1 the main effect of only the suppression variable is 
positive and significant. Furthermore, the interactions of both variables with the 
ownership variable are statistically significant, state owned newspapers publishing 
fewer paragraphs as censorship events increase than other newspapers. Differentiating 
between violent and non-violent censorship events we find that the violent censorship 
variable has no statistically significant impact on the dependent variable. The non-
violent censorship variable, however, has a negative and statistically significant effect 
on the dependent variable in Model 3.0. Model 3.1 shows that this effect is due to the 
interaction with the ownership variable, state owned newspapers reacting by publishing 
less as such events intensify. Lastly, when differentiating between censorship events 
against individuals and organizations we find that only the interaction of the individuals 
variable with the ownership variable is statistically significant, state owned newspapers 
publishing, as in the other models, less as these events intensify. Figure A.2 plots the 
interaction between newspaper ownership and the different censorship variables. 
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Figure 3: Reporting bias of state-owned newspapers as threats to the regime 
and threats to journalists increase 
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Media bias with regards to contentious mobilization 
Thus far, we have determined that differing characteristics of autocracies do 
influence the amount of coverage that contentious politics receive in the press to 
differing degrees and that direct ownership of newspapers is a highly effective means to 
impose compliance with the regime’s interests. At the same time, while effective at 
censoring news from beyond their borders, they are less so when contentious politics 
intensify on the home front. This leads to the question of whether the content of the 
news is also subject to similar influences.  
The remaining analyses will be concerned with this follow-up question. Table 1 
shows the results of a fourteen-topic model in terms of a list of the most probable word 
stems. This list was used to ex-post annotate the labels shown in the second column.  
The topics identified fall in three categories, the first consisting of broad topics 
related to the Arab Spring (i.e. peaceful protests, violent protests, democracy, 
revolution, and political implications), the second consisting of country specific topics 
(i.e. Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen) and the third being other broad topics, but with little 
bearing on the Arab Spring (i.e. judicial process, economy, regional conflicts and 
civilian perception).  Topic nr. 2 in our model is characterized by words relating to 
protests (e.g. protest, demonstr, march, ralli, movement, gather), the motive of the 
protests (e.g. call, govern, demand, anti, reform, pro, support, right), the participants in 
the protests (e.g. activist, poeopl, opposit, group), the timing and location of the protests 
(e.g. street, friday, week, squar). We label this topic peaceful protest in order to 
differentiate it from topic nr. 5, violent protest, which associates protests with violence 
(e.g. kill, fire, clash, dead, injur, wound) and the mobilization of state’s resources to 
meet this violence (e.g. polic, forc, secur, armi, troop). Topic nr. 3 is defined by words 
relating to wielders of political power (e.g. presid, leader, primeminist, rule, power, 
govern), but also institutions associated with democracy (e.g. elect, parti, opposite, 
constitut, will, vote, parliament), the jasmine revolution (e.g. ben, ali, tunisia) and the 
South Sudan independence referendum (e.g. sudan). Given the broad spectrum of this 
topic and the prominence of elections in it, we label it as democracy. Topic nr. 6 also 
touches upon events in two different countries, being characterized by words we 
strongly associate with the Egyptian revolution (e.g. revolut, protest, egypt, cairo, 
tahrir, squar, hosni, mubarak), but also with the Iranian green revolution (e.g. iranian, 
revolut, protest), which we thus label as the revolution topic. In topic nr. 7 the 
revolution aspect of contentious politics is also present (e.g. revolut), but there is a time 
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component (e.g. now, time) and an action perspective (e.g. will, can, need, must, take, 
chang, support) embedded in a broader political context (e.g. world, state, countri, 
region, arab). We label this topic the political implications of the Arab Spring.  
The topics nr. 4, 9, 10 and 11 we labeled as Iraq, Libya, Yemen and respectively 
Syria, since these topics abound of country-specific references. The most prominent 
words of the Iraq topic paint the image of localized acts of terror (e.g. kill, attack, bomb, 
suicid, explosion, blast) with specific targets (e.g. target, offici, polic, secur, soldier), 
but not naming the perpetuators. The Arab Spring events figure strongly in the Libya 
topic, both domestic and foreign parties fighting the regime being highlighted (e.g. 
rebel, nato, unitedn, benghazi). We also find references to the most defining actions 
undertaken by these parties, such as the no-fly zone (e.g. air). The Syria topic is defined 
not as much by the Arab Spring, as by Syria’s long lasting interests and involvement in 
Lebanon. We thus encounter next to the multiple references to Syria and its leader 
similar references to Lebanon and such describing the relationship between them (e.g. 
specialtribunalforlebanon, leagu, hezbullah). In the case of the Yemen topic, we also 
encounter references to domestic challengers to the rule of the long time autocratic 
leader from before the Arab Spring events (e.g. houthi, tribal, rebel), as well as foreign 
interests and involvements in local politics (e.g. saudi, saudiarabia, 
gulfcooperationcouncil).  
Topics nr. 1, 12, 13 and 14 cover other aspects related to contentious politics. In 
topic nr 1, the judicial process, we encounter words that cover the apprehension of 
individuals (e.g. arrest), the accusations brought against these individuals (e.g. accus, 
alleg, crime, charg), their defense (e.g. court, investig, lawyer, law, trial) up to their 
sentencing (e.g. sentenc, prison, releas). In topic nr. 13, the top of the list is held by the 
United States, followed by names of prominent terrorist groups (e.g. qaeda, taliban), 
names of the countries harboring them (e.g. afghanistan, pakistan) and the explicit 
naming of terrorism, which is why we labeled this topic war on terrorism. Another 
highly coherent topic is topic nr. 14, labeled as the economy topic due to the fact that 
words such as strikes, unions, workers and employees figure high on the list of words 
defining it. We named topic nr. 14 the civilian perception of contentious politics since 
this topic links the average civilian (e.g. women, peopl, young, famili, men, children, 
old) to places one frequents (e.g. street, school, home) and to the media (e.g. media, 
live, televis), while potential dangers from contentious politics, or any mention of 
contentious politics for that matter, are not encountered in the most prominent words of 
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this topic. Lastly, topic nr. 8 deals with two other regional conflicts, their causes being 
unrelated to the Arab Spring, namely the Israeli-Palestinian and the Turkish-Kurdish 
conflicts. 
 
Table 1: Label and list of characteristic words for the 14-topic model on paragraphs 
covering contentious mobilization 
 
Topic Label 25 most probable words (stems) 
1 Judicial Process 
arrest, court, right, prison, releas, charg, human, investig, accus, alleg, case, 
report, year, trial, state, law, also, lawyer, polic, crime, secur, sentenc, death, 
offic 
2 Peaceful Protest 
protest, demonstr, call, govern, demand, march, activist, peopl, ralli, bahrain, 
opposit, anti, reform, street, friday, thousand, support, movement, gather, 
group, pro, right, week, squar 
3 Democracy 
elect, parti, govern, presid, new, polit, leader, opposit, constitut, ali, will, 
group, primeminist, rule, year, sudan, power, vote, tunisia, ben, islamist, 
countri, parliament, nation 
4 Iraq 
kill, attack, bomb, peopl, two, offici, wound, polic, iraq, secur, suicid, three, 
soldier, explos, target, group, blast, provinc, one, four, violenc, civilian, car, 
citi 
 
5 Violent Protest 
polic, forc, citi, secur, peopl, kill, fire, clash, protest, resid, armi, violenc, town, 
two, least, dead, wit, report, area, injur, troop, one, wound, day 
 
6 Revolution 
egypt, mubarak, egyptian, cairo, militari, iran, presid, protest, hosni, tahrir, 
iranian, revolut, squar, former, council, offici, forc, say, rule, report, news, 
minist, state, armi 
7 Political Implications 
will, countri, arab, peopl, polit, regim, revolut, world, can, now, chang, support, 
state, power, one, time, like, region, mani, even, need, take, violenc, must 
 
8 Regional Conflicts 
israel, isra, palestinian, gaza, hama, border, turkey, turkish, strip, militari, 
kurdish, group, west, rocket, erdogan, fire, attack, bank, Jerusalem, 
kurdistanworkersparti, cross, fatah, war, offici 
9 Libya 
gaddafi, libya, rebel, libyan, forc, tripoli, nato, unitedn, leader, fight, militari, 
govern, civilian, air, benghazi, fighter, foreign, report, western, town, council, 
citi, muammar, told 
10 Yemen 
yemen, saleh, yemeni, presid, govern, saudi, abdullah, 
gulfcooperationcouncil, qaeda, ali, saudiarabia, sanaa, power, opposit, gulf, 
secur, rebel, countri, sana, houthi, fight, leader, office, tribal 
11 Syria 
syria, syrian, assad, lebanon, hariri, lebanes, hizbullah, damascus, arab, 
march, unitedn, specialtribunalforlebanon, govern, regim, presid, primeminist, 
beirut, say, bashar, leagu, hezbollah, report, polit, cabinet 
12 Civilian Perception 
one, year, women, peopl, show, old, mani, televis, young, famili, day, say, 
time, man, want, street, media, live, men, children, just, home, school, get 
 
13 War on Terrorism 
unitedst, pakistan, milit, qaeda, taliban, attack, afghanistan, offici, pakistani, 
militari, afghan, kill, forc, oper, govern, strike, terror, border, secur, bin, insurg, 
laden, troop, intellig 
14 Economy 
strike, oil, worker, million, union, countri, year, govern, compani, unrest, 
month, bank, day, work, employe, percent, aid, last, per, price, econom, 
week, trade, economi 
 
As evidenced in Figure 4 the prevalence of the democracy topic does not depend 
on the level of economic or legal control over the media and the degree of political 
control has only a slight negative influence. In contrast, the prevalence of the revolution 
topic does depend on the degree of control over the media. Whether economic, political 
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or legal control, the difference in topic prevalence between the freest press and the least 
free one is about 10%, while in the least free ones the topic is basically non-existent. 
Figure 5 shows the prevalence of these two topics as a function of MENA protests, 
domestic protests and overall censorship events. On the one hand, we again find that the 
covariates have only a slight effect on the prevalence of the democracy topic, while on 
the other hand they exercise a strong effect on the prevalence of the revolution topic. 
The positive relationship between the revolution topic and the MENA protests or the 
domestic protests variables is to be expected given the news-worthiness of a (potential) 
revolution. Interestingly, the same positive relationship can be observed between the 
topic prevalence and the censorship variable. Not only is the topic more likely to be 
used the more censorship events take place in country, but the relationship is even 
stronger than for the other two variables. Thus, despite the fact that both topics address 
regime change, we find quite different relationships between the topic prevalence and 
the considered variables. 
Another pair of related topics is formed by the peaceful protest and the political 
implications topics, both showing similar prevalence over time and, at least 
theoretically, one being the continuation of the other, contentious politics moving 
towards the sphere of normal politics. Looking at Figure 6, we see that the prevalence of 
the political implications topic doesn’t depend on economic, nor on political control, but 
has a rather strong negative relationship with the legal control. However, unlike for the 
revolution topic, even in countries with the greatest legal control over the press this 
topic is estimated to make up almost 10% of the paragraphs on contentious politics. 
This topic is thus not subject to strong censorship. The prevalence of the peaceful 
protests topic, however, has a slight yet positive relationship with all three variables. 
Despite these differences, as Figure 7 shows, we find that the prevalence of both topics 
rises as MENA protests, domestic protests, as well as censorship events intensify. Again 
it is interesting to observe that as the number of censorship events grows, so does the 
prevalence of both topics. 
Another example of paired topics is that of Syria and Libya. The Syria topic is 
subject to strong censorship similar to that of the revolution topic. For each variable of 
control over the press, we find that the prevalence of the topic diminishes as control 
grows. The difference in prevalence between the two extremes is about 10% and 
reaching in the one extreme 0%. Unlike the Syria topic, the Libya topic is subjected to 
less censorship. Economic control and legal control both exercise a strong negative 
		 18	
influence on the prevalence of this topic, while political control has only a negligible 
influence (see Figure 8). As evidenced in Figure 9, the Syria topic is the first case where 
the prevalence of the topic has a strong negative relationship with the three variables 
MENA protests, domestic protest and censorship events. These results suggest that 
when a country is facing high levels of domestic protests and steps up its censorship 
practices, this topic basically disappears from the press of the respective country. 
However, this is not the case for the Libya topic. The prevalence of the topic in a 
country’s press rises when MENA protests or domestic protests intensify, but it sinks 
when censorship events increase. 
There are also topics such as the judicial process and Yemen for which increased 
control over the press has a positive effect on the prevalence of the respective topic.  
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Figure 4: Topic Prevalence as a Function of Control over the Press (Democracy and Revolution) 
 
 
Figure 5: Topic Prevalence as a Function of MENA Protests, Domestic Protest and Censorship 
(Democracy and Revolution) 
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Figure 6: Topic Prevalence as a Function of Control over the Press (Political Implications and 
Peaceful Protests) 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Topic Prevalence as a Function of MENA Protests, Domestic Protest and Censorship 
(Political Implications and Peaceful Protests) 
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Figure 8: Topic Prevalence as a Function of Control over the Press (Syria and Libya) 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Topic Prevalence as a Function of MENA Protests, Domestic Protest and Censorship 
(Syria and Libya) 
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Conclusion 
Authoritarian regimes go to great lengths to limit what the media can write about 
and how to go about it. When faced with new and unexpected developments, one way to 
limit potential damage is to clamp down on the diffusion of the pertinent information. In 
the context of the Arab Spring uprisings this wasn’t an option however. Information 
about the magnitude of the Tunisian protests, the success of the Jasmine Revolution, as 
well as the follow up events elsewhere, spread through multiple channels at nearly 
instantaneous speeds. Information spread through channels outside the immediate 
control of the states: social media, foreign TV channels and mobile phones. In this paper 
we ask ourselves how authoritarian regimes in the MENA region reacted in this novel 
situation on one channel they did have some degree of control over, namely the 
domestic press. 
 Our analysis provides a first step in better understanding what censorship policies 
they may have employed. Our original corpus of more than 100’000 paragraphs on 
contentious politics from English-language newspapers of the MENA region shows that 
the Arab Spring protests were indeed a much-discussed topic in the MENA press at the 
time. Furthermore, our data on censorship events shows that regimes reacted to these 
unexpected developments by actively blocking the reporting of news about domestic 
protests. We also establish that the most effective means that authoritarian regimes have 
at their disposal in order to limit the dissemination of unwanted information is the 
economic control over the media, namely a big market share of state-owned outlets, 
limiting access of the independent media to resources necessary for news production, 
use of bribery, allocating/withdrawing advertising and subsidies etc. However, greater 
legal and political control over the media has a positive effect on the extent of coverage 
of contentious politics by the press, though this effect is orders of magnitudes lesser 
than that of the economic control. This suggests that greater legal and political control 
over the press makes it easier or safer for journalists to report on contentious politics by 
spelling out the rules on how to do so, namely the hypothesized reporting bias. 
Furthermore, we find that domestic threats to the survival of the authoritarian regime 
force the media to report on the issue. Each of our models shows that when domestic 
protests intensify, the press writes significantly more about contentious politics. 
However, ownership of the newspaper is also an important factor. State-owned media is 
much more susceptible to the regime’s wishes than other media. An increase in 
censorship events in a country has a deterrent effect only on the state-owned media. The 
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same media also stand out by actually reducing the coverage on contentious politics 
when protests in the region intensify.  However, when domestic protests intensify the 
same media increases its coverage even more than that of other media, presumably to 
champion the state’s preferred framing of the events. The count models also suggest that 
non-violent means of censorship and censorship aimed at individuals are highly 
efficient methods to ensure immediate compliance of the state owned media. One way 
to sum up these findings is that MENA states had little influence over the extent of 
coverage contentious politics received from the media not owned by them. However, 
the more autocratic a state is, the more media it seems to own. 
Our STM identifies fourteen topics used by the press to report on contentious 
politics, including some of the topics we expected to encounter such as revolution and 
democracy, but not others such as an Arab Spring related terrorism topic. The start of 
the Arab Spring marks a change in the reporting style of contentious politics. The 
MENA media finds new topics to use (e.g. Libya), lets go of old preferences (e.g. Iraq) 
and only few topics maintain their popularity throughout the entire period of 
investigation (e.g. violent protest). We find that the use of most topics is not entirely a 
decision made by the newspaper, the state also having a say. Topics such as revolution 
or Syria seem to be objects of censorship, their prevalence being almost nil in countries 
with the lowest levels of press freedom. At the same time press freedom has no 
influence with regards to topics such as political implications or democracy. One 
explanation for this discrepancy might be that the latter topics do not exclude the current 
ruling regime from the process of change and the demanded action can be localized as 
sometime in the future as opposed to right now. As noted above, topic prevalence also 
depends on the intensity of foreign protests and this is true for almost all topics. 
Intensifying domestic protests always have the same effect on topic prevalence as the 
foreign protests, though in some cases this effect is not as pronounced. This also holds 
true for all but one topic (i.e. Libya) when we look at the influence of increased 
domestic censorship practices. The fact that this variable has a positive effect on topics 
such as revolution, which is one of the most evident objects of censorship among the 
autocratic MENA states, seems to imply that Arab journalists do fight back. 
Our analysis has also a few limitations, the main consisting of the fact that we look 
only at the English-language publications, which might address a different segment of 
the population than the Arab-language ones. However, we consider that such reporting 
bias should be even more pronounced in the Arab-language publications. Other aspects 
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we consider to improve on are restricting censorship events to solely contentious 
politics and domestic media and improving on the topic model with as sentiment 
analysis.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Media data overview 
Newspaper Ownership Country N 
Paragraphs 
Total 
N 
Paragraphs 
Relevant 
Start of 
Coverage 
End of 
Coverage 
BNA State Bahrain 1824 283 01.09.2009 31.12.2011 
Gulf Daily News Other Bahrain 29788 2037 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
Daily News Egypt Other Egypt 56917 11880 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
The Egyptian Gazette State Egypt 3405 855 01.07.2010 31.12.2011 
NINA State Iraq 335 42 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
The Kurdish Globe Other Iraq 2223 200 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
AmmanNet Other Jordan 579 61 01.07.2010 31.12.2011 
The Jordan Times State Jordan 20347 3408 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
The Star Other Jordan 5344 413 01.03.2009 31.09.2011 
The Daily Star Other Lebanon 51202 13219 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
JANA State Libya 1297 311 01.10.2009 31.12.2011 
The Tripoli Post State Libya 3635 1574 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
Oman Tribune Other Oman 65985 16162 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
ONA State Oman 596 16 01.09.2009 31.12.2011 
The Week Other Oman 706 3 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
Times of Oman Other Oman 31305 5898 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
The Palestine Chronicle Other Palestine 18722 1414 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
WAFA State Palestine 3833 854 01.09.2009 31.12.2011 
Asharq Alawsat State Pan-Arab 3958 1233 01.07.2010 31.12.2011 
Dar Al Hayat State Pan-Arab 9383 1508 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
The Majalla Other Pan-Arab 1780 495 01.04.2009 31.12.2011 
The Middle East 
Reporter 
Other Pan-Arab 13982 8025 01.08.2010 31.12.2011 
Qatar Tribune Other Qatar 2593 251 01.09.2009 31.12.2011 
The Peninsula Other Qatar 8928 4717 01.04.2010 31.12.2011 
Arab News Other Saudi Arabia 8901 1517 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
Khaleej Times Other Saudi Arabia 14242 618 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
Saudi Gazette Other Saudi Arabia 36671 6726 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
7 Days Other UAE 6025 430 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
Gulf News Other UAE 34732 4104 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
The National  State UAE 97884 11216 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
UMCI News Other UAE 3292 1274 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
SABA State Yemen 1660 775 01.07.2009 31.12.2011 
Yemen Times Other Yemen 7506 2664 01.01.2009 31.12.2011 
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Table A.2: Results of negative binominal regressions on 
number of paragraphs covering contentious mobilization 
 Model 1.0 
Model 
1.1 
Model 
2.0 
Model 
2.1 
Model 
3.0 
Model 
3.1 
Model 
4.0 
Model 
4.1 
Economic 
Control 
 
-0.637 
(0.071) 
*** 
 
-0.688 
(0.070) 
*** 
 
-0.631 
(0.071) 
*** 
 
-0.677 
(0.070) 
*** 
 
-0.636 
(0.071) 
*** 
 
-0.695 
(0.070) 
*** 
 
-0.633 
(0.071) 
*** 
 
-0.685 
(0.070) 
**** 
Political 
Control 
0.111 
(0.038) 
** 
0.077 
(0.037) 
* 
0.110 
(0.038) 
** 
0.076 
(0.037) 
* 
0.200 
(0.038) 
*** 
0.078 
(0.037) 
* 
0.112 
(0.038) 
** 
0.070 
(0.038) 
Legal 
Control 
0.335 
(0.076) 
*** 
0.368 
(0.075) 
*** 
0.334 
(0.076) 
*** 
0.366 
(0.075) 
*** 
0.344 
(0.076) 
*** 
0.369 
(0.075) 
*** 
0.330 
(0.076) 
*** 
0.371 
(0.075) 
*** 
Owner  
(State) 
-0.426 
(0.068) 
*** 
-0.080 
(0.078) 
 
-0.421 
(0.068) 
*** 
-0.087 
(0.079) 
 
0.130 
(0.068) 
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Figure A.1: Results of word2vec topic coherence evaluation 
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Figure A.2: Reporting bias of state-owned newspapers based on type of censorship 
employed 
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